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Abstract 
Adopting a counterfactual approach to the evaluation of a regional R&D collaboration 
policy, carried out in Tuscany (Italy), we investigate different types of persistent 
network additionality, namely persistence effect, breadth effect, composition effect, 
and depth effect. Our findings reveal that this R&D collaboration policy has been able 
to generate some persistent changes in the networking behaviour of participating 
firms, particularly fostering their collaboration with universities. Network 
additionality has been greater for firms that were previously accustomed to 
collaborating with other firms, than for less collaborative firms. With respect to the 
former firms, we also find a composition effect, which implies a change in their type 
of partners in innovation-related activities. We find, instead, no evidence of network 
breadth and network depth effects. 
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1. Introduction 
The last twenty years have witnessed the diffusion of innovation policies that attempt 
to foster innovation by encouraging interactions between organizations with different 
knowledge and competencies (Mowery, 1994; Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1997; 
Georghiou, 2002; Autio et al., 2008), primarily by providing funds for the 
implementation of R&D collaboration projects. Although promoting R&D is the 
primary objective of such interventions, the instrumental objective is clearly that of 
stimulating networking. Many regional interventions of this kind have targeted small 
and medium-sized firms (SMEs), which, despite their pressing need for sourcing 
external knowledge, have limited knowledge and skills to invest in the screening and 
identification of partners to collaborate with (Davenport et al., 1998; Bougrain and 
Haudeville, 2002; Narula, 2004).  
 
The problem of how to analyze and evaluate such policies has entered the agenda of 
both researchers and policymakers. The concept of network or collaboration 
additionality, which refers to the ability of a policy intervention to stimulate learning 
processes that result in changes in the network of participating organisations during 
and/or after the project’s implementation (Davenport et al., 1998; Luukkonen, 2000; 
Fier et al., 2006; Autio et al., 2008; Clarysse et al., 2009; Afcha Chávez, 2010; 
Wanzenböck et al., 2013; Knockaert et al., 2014), can be fruitfully used for this 
purpose. Indeed, it is important to investigate whether and to what extent R&D 
collaboration policies have achieved one of their main goals, that is, to support 
participating firms’ ability to collaborate with other organisations. 
 
Existing assessments of R&D collaboration policies have focused on the simultaneous 
network additionality of the interventions, measured throughout the duration of the 
collaboration projects. Studies have analyzed whether these policies have fostered 
R&D collaborations between firms that were not previously engaged in these 
activities (e.g. Afcha Chavéz, 2010; Wanzenböck et al., 2012); other studies, focusing 
on firms that were already used to collaborate with other organisations, have 
examined whether these policies have induced them to collaborate with new partners 
(Davenport et al., 1998; Luukkonen, 2000; Caloffi et al., 2015). However, evidence 
on the persistent network additionality of R&D collaboration policies, beyond the 
duration of the collaboration projects, is still scant. The seminal contribution of Fier et 
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al. (2006), which shows that university-industry R&D collaborations that start with 
policy support are likely to end with the end of the policy, is, to our knowledge, the 
only one to have taken a step in this direction.  
 
 
The aim of the paper is to fill this gap by exploring empirically the persistent network 
additionality of R&D collaboration policies. We also add to the existing literature by 
untangling different types of network additionality that can be stimulated by policy 
participation after the end of the funded project, which we test empirically: i) a 
persistence effect, which occurs when firms continue to collaborate with external 
organisations; ii) a breadth effect, which refers to an increase in the breadth of firms’ 
networks (firms create relationships with organisations with which they did not have 
any prior connections); iii) a composition effect, which occurs when firms change the 
type of organisations with which they collaborate; and, iv) a network depth effect, 
which refers to a change in the intensity of collaborations. 
 
 
While previous evidence on network additionality has been mainly descriptive, we 
use a propensity score matching approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to make 
inference on a set of original data that we have collected through an ad hoc survey. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 puts forward some hypotheses about how 
participation in an R&D collaboration policy intervention can induce firms to learn 
more about networking, and what are the likely consequences for their subsequent 
propensity to network with other organisations. Section 3 illustrates the empirical case, 
which provides the data we have used to test our hypotheses: a regional R&D 
collaboration policy implemented in the Italian region of Tuscany between 2002 and 
2008 with European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) support. Section 4 explains 
the empirical strategy we have adopted for the analysis of this policy, and section 5 
presents data and variables. Section 6 presents and discusses the results. Section 7 
concludes with some implications for policy and management, and with some 
proposed avenues for further research. 
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2. R&D collaboration policies and their persistent network effects  
To build a logical causal chain that can guide us in the empirical analysis of the 
persistent network additionality of R&D collaborations, we draw on recent 
contributions on the learning capabilities of organisations (Clarysse et al., 2009; 
Knockaert et al., 2014; Roper and Dundas, 2016; Chapman and Hewitt-Dundas, 
2016), which reference the concepts of organisational learning by experience (Cyert 
and March, 1963), interaction with external organisations (Huber, 1991; Levinson and 
Asahi, 1996; Kogut, 2000) and absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1998, 
1990). We also consider the cumulative effects of learning (Van den Bosch et al. 
1999) and networking (Gulati, 1995; Powell et al., 1996; Walker et al., 1997; Chung 
et al., 2000).  
 
In order to source new knowledge through networks, firms must possess a range of 
knowledge and capabilities to value, interpret and absorb information and knowledge 
that flows from other organisations (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Policy can 
play an important role in this process. Indeed, by funding R&D collaboration projects, 
policymakers encourage firms to undertake two types of activities that can influence 
firms’ networking abilities: engagement in R&D, and networking. 
 
Through networking, firms’ personnel can learn how to manage inter-organisational 
relationships through experience and interaction (Cyert and March, 1963; Huber, 
1991; Kogut, 2000). In the course of R&D collaboration projects, firms’ managers 
may create or strengthen the appropriate interfaces and routines to exchange 
information and knowledge with other organisations, and other staff can learn how to 
use and modify them (Van den Bosch et al., 1999; Tierlinck and Spithoven, 2013).  
 
Through engagement in R&D, firms can learn how to interpret, manipulate, and 
internalize external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). This can increase 
the expected return on future collaborations, and thus the firm’s likelihood to enter 
into future collaborations (Powell et al., 1996; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Lane et al., 
2006; Escribano et al., 2009; Huang and Yu, 2011). 
 
Since firms’ learning depends on the knowledge they already possess and on the 
routines that are in place (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990; Van den Bosch et al. 
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1999), the new organisational structure and the new knowledge and competencies that 
are sourced through interactions with other organisations can improve firms’ ability to 
interact and to learn from interactions, thus increasing the likelihood that they will 
enter into further relationships once the R&D collaboration project has been 
completed. Therefore, drawing on the above, we put forward our hypothesis H1.  
 
H1 (persistence effect): Participation in a publicly-funded R&D collaboration project 
increases SMEs’ willingness to engage in subsequent innovation-related interactions 
with external organisations.  
 
R&D collaboration policies do not usually aim just to stimulate networking in general 
terms. Very often, these policies aim to facilitate technology transfer processes and to 
stimulate networking with specific types of organisations – in particular, with 
knowledge-intensive organisations such as universities or other research centers 
(Cunningham and Gök, 2016), as well as with a variety of intermediaries that can 
support SMEs’ engagement with knowledge-intensive agents (Howells, 2006). This 
means that learning through experience occurs with respect to some types of agents. If 
the policy has been effective, the skills and knowledge gained during the project will 
render the firms that have been involved in R&D collaboration projects more open to 
subsequent collaboration with these organisations. Therefore, we detail hypothesis H1 
as follows. 
 
H1a: Participation in a publicly-funded R&D collaboration project increases SMEs’ 
willingness to engage in subsequent innovation-related interactions with universities 
or other research centers. 
H1b: Participation in a publicly-funded R&D collaboration project increases SMEs’ 
willingness to engage in subsequent innovation-related interactions with 
intermediaries.  
 
The increase in networking that results from participation in an R&D collaboration 
policy tells us that the intervention has achieved its goal. One can be content with this 
result, or can, as in our case, attempt to unfold the different types of network 
additionality that can be stimulated by participation in the policy intervention. In 
order to do so, we consider three specific types of learning effects that firms can 
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derive from their participation in publicly-funded R&D collaboration projects. The 
first is a breadth effect, which refers to the increase in the number of organisations 
with which the firm collaborates for the development of its innovation-related 
activity. In fact, participation in the R&D collaboration projects may stimulate firms 
to enter into direct or indirect contact with a number of organisations with which they 
did not collaborate previously (Luukkonen, 2000; Fier et al., 2006; Caloffi et al., 
2015). This may happen, for example, when the policy requires the formation of 
partnerships that include a minimum amount of partner organisations (Rossi et al., 
2016). As firms that have direct or indirect ties with other organisations in existing 
networks are more likely to form future alliances (Gulati, 1995; Powell et al., 1996; 
Walker et al., 1997; Chung et al., 2000), these new partners may form the basis for a 
broadening of the firm’s network. Therefore:  
 
H2 (breadth effect): Participation in a publicly-funded R&D collaboration project 
stimulates SMEs to expand the breadth of their network, i.e. to collaborate with an 
increased number of partners in subsequent innovation-related activities. 
 
The second effect is the composition effect. This effect refers to the fact that, as a 
result of policy participation, firms may begin to collaborate with new types of 
organisations, with which they did not collaborate previously (see also Falk, 2007). 
This may happen, for example, when the policy requires the creation of partnerships 
that include a certain type of organisation with which the company had no previous 
relationships (Rossi et al., 2016). More generally, as participation in the R&D project 
increases the firm’s knowledge and skills, after the end of the funded project the firm 
may be able to work with a wider range of organisations. For this reason we put 
forward the following hypothesis: 
 
H3 (composition effect): Participation in a publicly-funded R&D collaboration 
project stimulates SMEs to change the composition of their network by collaborating 
with new types of partners in subsequent innovation-related activities. 
  
The third effect is the network depth effect, which refers to the fact that policy 
participation can stimulate greater frequency of existing collaborations with external 
organisations. Indeed, SMEs can be involved in innovation networks, but, given their 
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relative lack of skills and resources to be devoted to activities which fall outside their 
core operations, their involvement in such networks can be infrequent and brief 
(Caloffi et al., 2015). Participation in a publicly-funded R&D collaboration project 
could stimulate small firms to carry out R&D activities in a more stable and 
structured way than in the past and, for this reason, to trigger - ex post - an 
intensification of existing collaborations. Drawing on the above, we formulate our 
fourth hypothesis as follows. 
 
H4 (depth effect): Participation in a publicly-funded R&D collaboration project 
stimulates SMEs to intensify the collaboration with existing partners 
 
3. Tuscany’s regional policy in support of R&D collaboration  
Our empirical analysis focuses on a policy supporting R&D collaboration projects 
implemented by the Tuscany region, in Italy, with ERDF support. Since the 
constitutional reform introduced in the 2000s, Italian regions are responsible for most 
enterprise and innovation policies, and Tuscany has been one of the most active 
promoters of R&D collaboration policies in Italy (Caloffi and Mariani, 2017). In 
particular, we analyze nine public tenders that were launched between 2002 and 2008 
under different programmes, all having the same goal. These constituted the whole set 
of network policy interventions implemented by the region in the 2000-2006 EU 
programming period (Russo and Rossi, 2009; Bellandi and Caloffi, 2010).  
 
The regional government launched the above mentioned public tenders in order to 
stimulate local SMEs to develop non-transitory forms of collaboration with 
universities, innovation service providers, other firms, and other organisations, in 
order to acquire new external knowledge and carry out R&D projects. Through these 
tenders, Tuscany’s regional government funded 168 projects, for a total funding of € 
37 million, which were carried out in the years 2002-2008.  The following Table 1 
presents a count of the organisations that participated in these tenders, grouped 
according to the year in which the tenders were launched. 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Table 1. Basic features of the observed framework of policies 
Year in 
which 
tender 
was 
launched 
Acronym of 
the policy 
programme   
Number of 
funded R&D 
collaboration 
projects 
Number of 
participants in 
funded R&D 
collaboration 
projects  
Of which: number of 
firms in funded R&D 
collaboration projects  
Of which: number of firms in 
funded R&D collaboration 
projects receiving a single 
grant 
2002 
RPIA, SPD 
1.7.1, SPD 
1.7.2 23 363 187 135 
2004 
SPD 1.7.1 
(A), SPD 
1.7.1 20 112 48 22 
2005 SPD 1.7.1 36 833 341 217 
2006 RPIA 12 80 57 34 
2007 SPD 1.7.1 41 333 136 70 
2008 SPD 1.7.1 36 282 143 57 
Note to table: RPIA stands for Regional Program of Innovative Actions, while SPD stands for Single 
Programming Document 2000-2006, which is the policy document that specifies the use of EU funds 
by the region for the programming period 2000-2006.The number of participants refers to all 
participation instances, including participations by organisations that did not receive any funds. As 
multiple participation was often admitted (both in the same tender and across different tenders), the 
total by column does not correspond to the total number of participating organisations.  
 
 
A total of 677 SMEs were involved in the observed tenders. Large firms could 
participate, but without receiving any public funds. Besides firms, the R&D 
collaboration projects involved universities and research centers, and other 
organisations. Given that participation to multiple tenders was admitted, 142 out of 
the 677 participating SMEs received funds from more than one tender. For reasons 
that will be explained in the following section, our analysis focuses on the group of 
535 SMEs that only received a single grant.  
 
 
4. The empirical strategy 
In order to evaluate the effects of the observed policy, we adopt a matching approach 
that is common in the programme evaluation literature (Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009), and in particular we follow the procedure systematized by Abadie and Imbens 
(2011).1 Given that the variables we are most interested in, which are related to the 
networking behaviour of participating organisations, were not available in ready-to-
use general datasets, we collected information through a questionnaire.  
 
                                                 
 
1 However, unlike these authors we do not use a double robust correction because we have binary 
variables. 
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We developed our empirical strategy in two steps, both of which rely on propensity 
score matching techniques, although aimed at different goals. In the first step, we 
performed a matched sampling to identify a reservoir of potential control firms to be 
interviewed. The control firms are SMEs that did not receive funding under any of the 
nine tenders, but which shared many other characteristics with the 535 SMEs that 
participated in the nine tenders and received a single grant (the latter are called the 
‘treated firms’, following the standard terminology in matching models). Then, in the 
second step, after having collected interview information, propensity score matching 
was used again for the purpose of estimating the effects of the policy on the SMEs’ 
networking behaviour (‘treatment effects’).  
 
In particular, drawing on data available in public archives (the ASIA public archive)2 
for all the regional firms, in the first step we estimated a propensity score from a 
number of basic features such as: firms’ sector, legal ownership form, province, 
number of employees. The matched sampling was performed year by year, by 
considering the SMEs involved in one tender at a time. This way, we chose 5 
potential control firms for each treated firm, with replacement. Among the control 
firms, we also considered the 391 firms that participated only in the 130 projects that 
unsuccessfully applied for funding under the nine tenders ( ‘non-funded’ firms). 
  
We necessarily restricted our analysis to the treated firms that survived throughout the 
whole period under analysis (85%). Treated and potential controls, the latter including 
non-funded firms, were then invited to fill in a questionnaire to investigate their 
innovation behaviour before and after their participation in the policy in year t: one 
year prior to the beginning of the publicly-funded R&D collaboration project (t-1) and 
three years after the beginning of the project (i.e., two years after the end of the 
project, given that the average project length was one year; t+2). The questionnaire 
was sent to 2,497 firms, which answered between December 2014 and July 2015. The 
response rate was about 20% (489 firms). We explain below how we dealt with the 
problem of non-response, while more information on the questionnaire can be found 
in the next section.  
                                                 
 
2 ASIA is a database collected and maintained by Italy’s national statistical agency ISTAT. ASIA in 
particular collects a wide range of economic information about all Italian companies. 
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We asked firms whether they had benefited from (other) government incentives in the 
period under observation, in order to exclude multi-treated firms. For this reason, we 
excluded 46 respondents.3 Of the remaining 443 respondents, 79 were treated firms 
and 364 were firms among which we could choose the controls to be included in the 
estimation. 
 
A critical issue in the analysis of survey data concerns the presence of missing data 
due to non-response, which may lead to biased estimates, especially when the lack of 
response depends on the outcome variable (Little and Rubin, 2014). We considered 
this circumstance as being very unlikely to occur, since we believed that the 
information collected through the questionnaire was not so sensitive as to push 
companies to not respond. On the other hand, we worried that the answer might still 
not be regarded as completely random. Under these circumstances, it makes sense to 
assume that no response occurs at random conditional on a vector of observable 
variables, including those used for estimating the propensity score. Therefore, in order 
to deal with this problem, we implemented an inverse probability weighting strategy 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Rotnitzky, 2009).  
 
For each agent that was included in the survey, we calculated a weight equal to the 
inverse of its probability of response and then used it in the stage of estimation of the 
average treatment on the treated (ATT). In so doing, the contribution of each 
respondent is directly proportional to the “rarity” of information provided by the same 
respondent. In order to estimate the probability of response we used the variables that 
had been already used to perform the matched sampling (sector, province, legal 
ownership form, number of employees at time t-1). More precisely, the probability of 
response , with T=1 identifying the treated firms, is estimated by means of a 
logistic model, whose response variable equals one if the treated firm participates in 
the survey and zero otherwise. The inverse-probability weight wi,T=1 is given by 1/πi, 
T=1.  
                                                 
 
3 This choice is justified by the fact that, in the case of multi-treated firms, it is difficult to identify a 
clear causal link between participation in a specific tender and firms’ outcomes. This is the same 
reason for which, as mentioned in section 3, we also excluded firms that had benefited from more than 
one treatment within the tender observed, which were not invited to take part in the survey. 
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The second step of our analysis consisted in improving the matching between treated 
and controls by calculating a new propensity score that included the information 
collected through the survey. We were thus able to identify a number of treated-
control matches not only on the basis of the firms’ structural features described above, 
but also on the basis of the number and type of relationships with universities, 
innovation services providers and other manufacturing enterprises, that these SMEs 
had before the policy. Moreover, we considered the type of innovative behaviours the 
SMEs had before the policy, and in particular whether they had some absorptive 
capacity or whether they were innovators (i.e. whether they had introduced innovative 
products and services on the market).  
 
Having calculated the new propensity score, the matching was then made through the 
nearest neighbor method (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
Each treated firm was matched with the nearest control, and we imposed an exact 
match for treatment year and lagged value of the outcome variable.4 Finally, the ATT 
estimation was done as follows. First, we applied the inverse-probability weights 
illustrated above to the treated units. Each control unit received the weight of the 
treated firm to which it was matched. This weighting approach makes sense if one is 
interested in an ATT, where control firms are supposed to be the twins of treated 
firms. Second, for each of the outcome variables, we computed the ATT as the 
difference in means between treated firms and the corresponding (weighted) controls: 
a positive and significant value of the ATT would indicate that the policy intervention 
had an effect the corresponding outcome variable, since the treated firms after the 
policy intervention had values of the outcome variables that were higher than those of 
matching control firms that had not benefitted from the policy intervention. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
4 We considered only firms in the common support, i.e. in the range of values of the propensity score in 
which we have both treated and control firms. 
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5. Data and variables 
5.1. Pre-matching and matching variables  
As explained in the previous section, the data we used in the different stages of our 
empirical strategy (matched sampling, calculation of the propensity score and 
matching) came both from administrative sources and from the survey we performed 
on treated firms and potential controls. The variables are listed in Table 2, with the 
specification of the stage in which they were used. 
 
The survey was performed from December 2014 to July 2015. Treated firms and 
potential controls were sent a link by email to access the online questionnaire, which 
was valid for two weeks. Subsequently, firms that had not answered were sent another 
reminder, with a new link. Finally, companies that had not filled out the 
questionnaire, or that had filled it only partially, were contacted telephonically and 
asked to fill in the questionnaire during the call. The interviews were directed to the 
firm’s CEO or to a manager who had been involved in the R&D collaboration 
projects (for treated firms) or was responsible for R&D activities (for controls).  
 
SMEs were asked to provide information about the presence and the features of their 
innovation-related collaborations with three types of partners: i) universities and 
research centers, ii) innovation services providers, and iii) other manufacturing 
enterprises. Besides checking for the presence or absence of these relationships in the 
periods before and after the end of the R&D collaboration project, we also asked 
information about the intensity of those relationships, and the stability of links with 
the same partners over time. In addition, we posed questions about the firm’s general 
innovation activities, including the number of innovations created, the amount of 
R&D expenditure, the presence of an internal R&D lab.  
 
In addition to information from the ASIA public archive and the dummy variable 
related to the treatment, in the calculation of the new propensity score we included the 
following variables from the survey: i) a dummy variable taking the value of one if, 
before the policy, the firm had relationships with universities or research centers 
(universities pre); ii) the same dummy variable as in i), but referred to public service 
providers such as innovation or technology transfer centers, which are an important 
type of innovation intermediary (Howells, 2006) (intermediaries pre); iii) the same 
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dummy variable as in i), but referred to other firms (other firms pre); iv) a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if, before the policy, the firm had some absorptive 
capacity, i.e. if the firm performed R&D and/or staff training activities (absorptive 
pre); v) a dummy variable taking the value of one if, before the policy, the firm had 
introduced new or significantly improved goods and services in the market (innovator 
pre). 
 
The proxy for a firm’s absorptive capacity is, unlike most studies, a combination of 
the firm’s internal R&D and staff training activities. As noted by Muscio (2007), in 
the case of SMEs, which perform relatively little internal R&D activities, the latter 
processes gain particular relevance.   
 
5.2 Outcome variables 
Consistently with the hypotheses that we have presented above, we use a number of 
variables to characterize different types of network additionality. As changing one’s 
behaviour takes time, all the outcome variables we consider refer to a non-immediate 
time horizon, which is three years after the start of the project or, as the R&D 
collaboration projects lasted one year on average, two years after the end of the 
project (t+2). First, in order to understand whether the participation in these projects 
increased SMEs’ willingness to engage in subsequent innovation-related interactions 
with external organisations, we created the variable network persistence, which is a 
dummy with value one if the firm claimed to collaborate with external organisations 
after the policy. In order to detail the type of organisations with which such 
collaboration occurred (see hypotheses H1a and H1b), we defined the following 
variables: i) a dummy variable with value one if, after the policy, the firm had 
relationships with universities or research centers (universities); ii) the same dummy 
variable as in i), but referred to public service providers (intermediaries); the same 
dummy variable as in i), but referred to other firms (other firms). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
15 
 
Table 2. Descriptives 
Variable Description Source Phase Mean of 
treated firms 
Difference 
between treated 
and control firms 
(firms after 
matching) 
Outcome variables: 
  
  
Network 
persistence 
Dummy with value 1 if the firm had relationships with 
external organisations in order to perform its innovative 
activities, 2 years after the end of the policy (i.e. from 
time t+2 to time t+3, with t=year of the policy) 
I M 0.608 0.239 
Universities Dummy with value 1 if the firm had relationships with 
universities in order to perform its innovative activities, 
2 years after the end of the policy  
I M 0.494 0.378 
Intermediaries Dummy with value 1 if the firm had relationships with 
innovation intermediaries (public service providers) in 
order to perform its innovative activities, 2 years after 
the end of the policy 
I M 0.380 0.234 
Other firms Dummy with value 1 if the firm had relationships with 
other firms in order to perform its innovative activities, 
2 years after the end of the policy 
I M 0.418 0.235 
Network breadth Dummy with value 1 if, 2 years after the end of the 
policy, the firm had increased its network of external 
collaborations 
I M 0.430 0.274 
Network 
composition 
Dummy with value 1 if, 2 years after the end of the 
policy, the firm collaborated with a type of agent with 
which it had no previous collaborations 
I M 0.253 -0.495 
Network depth Dummy with value 1 if, 2years after the policy, the 
frequency of the relationships with existing partners, 
with which collaboration in t-1 was infrequent, 
increased 
I M 0.354 0.222 
Other variables:     
Collaboration pre Dummy with value 1 if the firm had relationships with 
external organisations, 1 year before the beginning of 
the policy (i.e. time t-1, with t=year of the policy). 
I M 0.595 0.209 
Universities pre Dummy with value 1 if the firm had relationships with 
universities, 1 year before the beginning of the policy 
I M 0.392 0.203 
Intermediaries pre Dummy with value 1 if the firm had relationships with 
innovation intermediaries (public service providers), 1 
year before the beginning of the policy 
I M 0.367 0160 
Other firms pre Dummy with value 1 if the firm had relationships with 
other firms, 1 year before the beginning of the policy 
I M 0.392 0.114 
Absorptive capacity 
pre 
Dummy with value 1 if the firm was an R&D performer 
and/or had internal training activities, 1 year before the 
beginning of the policy 
I M 0.620 0.204 
Innovator pre Dummy with value 1 if the firm was an innovator, 
introducing products in the market, 1 year before the 
beginning of the policy 
I M  0.354 0.144 
Sector Categorical variable describing firms' sector: A S, W, M   
 Food products   0.063 -0.005 
 Marble products   0.063 -0.011 
 Textiles, clothing, shoes   0.127 -0.016 
 Chemicals   0.038 0.014 
 Metallurgy and metal products   0.165 0.005 
 Computer systems, electrical machinery and equipment   0.101 0.017 
 Motor vehicles, trailers   0.051 0.027 
 Furniture   0.038 -0.037 
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 Electricity, gas, heat, water   0.013 -0.001 
 Construction industry   0.051 0.007 
 Wholesale and retail trade   0.013 -0.008 
 Transportation services   0.013 -0.004 
 Information technology   0.076 -0.033 
 R&D services   0.038 -0.021 
 Other business services   0.089 -0.016 
 Other sectors   0.063 0.040 
Employees Categorical variable describing the number of 
employees 
A S, W, M   
 Micro-sized firm, with a number of employees 0<x<10   0.468 -0.033 
 Small-sized firm (10<=x<30)   0.304 0.002 
 Small-sized firm (30<=x<50)   0.114 -0.025 
 Medium-sized firm (50<=x<250)   0.114 0.056 
Joint_stock Dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm is a joint-stock 
company 
A S, W, M 0.671 0.012 
Province Categorical variable describing firms' location 
(province):  
A S, W, M   
 Massa Carrara   0.089 0.028 
 Lucca   0.038 0.001 
 Pistoia   0.025 -0.019 
 Florence   0.253 -0.025 
 Livorno   0.101 0.013 
 Pisa   0.089 -0.061 
 Arezzo   0.025 -0.022 
 Siena   0.127 -0.012 
 Grosseto   0.089 0.048 
 Prato   0.165 0.049 
Note to table: Minimum and maximum values are 0 and 1 respectively. Treated firms are 79 and 
control firms are 87. Source refers to the type of source that we used to build the data: I stands for 
interviews and A stands for administrative archives. Phase refers to the specific stage of the empirical 
strategy in which we have used the variable, which is specified as follows: S=matched sampling; 
W=weights; M=matching: estimation of network additionality. Mean of treated firms reports weighted 
values. The difference between treated and controls is calculated using matched pairs of treated and 
controls after matching, and figures are absolute values. Note that both controls and treated firms can 
be repeated.  
 
Second, we analyzed different types of network additionality of the policy. In order to 
test hypotheses H2 - H4 we defined the following three variables: network breadth, 
which is a dummy with value one if, after the policy, the SME increased the number 
of organisations with which it collaborated in innovation-related activities; network 
composition, which is a dummy with value one if, after the policy, the SME started to 
collaborate with at least one new type of organisation with which it did not 
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collaborate previously5; network depth, which is a dummy with value one if, after the 
policy, the frequency of the relationships with existing partners, with whom 
collaboration was occasional, increased compared to the period before the policy. 
These different types of network additionality are tested on the two subgroups of 
SMEs that, prior to the policy, did and did not collaborate with external partners in the 
development of their innovation activities.6 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the difference between treated and control firms related 
to the covariates measured before the policies (i.e. at time t-1) is very small. The same 
holds true for the time-invariant features of the observed firms that we have inserted 
in the propensity score. It has to be also noted that this difference is further reduced in 
the estimation of the ATT thanks to the further imposition of an exact match for the 
lagged values of the outcome variables and for the year of the tender.   
 
 
 
6. The network effect of the policy 
The observation of the entire group of treated firms shows that the R&D collaboration 
policy has generated network additionality only with respect to certain types of 
organisations. On average, we do not find any evidence of persistence effect (the 
variable network persistence reports positive but not significant values), which means 
that the hypothesis H1 is rejected. However, when we differentiated the effect with 
respect to the types of agents with which firms could collaborate, we find that the 
policies had a positive effect particularly on the relationships with universities. Thus, 
                                                 
 
5 We considered three different types of organisations: universities or research centres, innovation 
intermediaries and manufacturing firms. The variable network composition takes the value of one if, for 
instance, in the year t+2 the observed firm collaborated with a university and in the year t-1 the firm 
was not collaborating with universities. 
6To define this latter set of variables we used the information from two questions of the questionnaire, 
which asked the firm’s CEO (or the manager responsible for the firm’s R&D activities) what was the 
intensity of the relationship with universities, service providers, and other firms one year before the 
participation in the funded project and two years after the end of the project, both measured in a scale 
from 0=no relationship to 4=very often. The dummy takes the value of one if the intensity of the 
collaboration increased at least with respect to one type of organisation (i.e. 
universities/intermediaries/other firms). This is the information that suffers the most from the 
interviewees’ perceptions, as well as from the accuracy of their memories. However, it must be 
observed that these questions were asked to the people who were directly involved in the innovative 
activities of the firm. Moreover, the observed firms were mostly of small size, and the respondents 
were directly involved in all types of activities. 
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our hypothesis H1a is confirmed. On the contrary, we do not find any networking 
effect with respect to innovation intermediaries (H1b is rejected), nor to other firms.  
 
Table 3. Behavioural effects of the policies on the whole population of treated firms 
 Outcome variable ATT SE  
Network persistence 0.142 0.092  
Universities 0.224 0.076 *** 
Intermediaries 0.096 0.080  
Other firms 0.087 0.082  
Note to table: Treated firms are 79 and controls are 87. Statistical significance: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, 
***p< 0.01 
 
The analysis of the different types of network additionality we described above lets us 
account also for possible effects of the policy intervention on the type and intensity of 
the participating firms’ collaborations. We considered the following two groups of 
treated firms: those that prior to policy participation were accustomed to collaborate 
with other organisations for the development of their innovation-related activities, and 
those that did not have this kind of collaboration experience (Table 4). 
 
For both groups, we found that the policy generated network additionality only with 
respect to some types of organisations (universities in particular). It is interesting to 
note that network persistence was greater for firms that had previous experience of 
collaboration than for less collaborative firms. Indeed, for the former group, the 
probability of creating subsequent relationships with universities increased by about 
27% (about +22% in the case of the relationships with other firms), while for firms 
that had no previous collaborations this probability only increased by +14%. 
Moreover, firms with prior propensity towards collaboration also enjoyed an increase 
in their relationships with other firms. This would confirm that networking can have a 
cumulative effect. No significant effects were reported in the case of the relationships 
with intermediaries. Probably, after having worked together with the universities and 
research centers on the funded projects, companies had learned to interact directly 
with these organisations, without the need for intermediaries such as innovation 
centers and the like.  
 
Besides increasing the willingness to engage in subsequent innovation-related 
interactions with universities, participation in the policy induced changes in the 
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composition of the partners in innovation-related relationships of firms that had prior 
collaborations. Indeed, the variable network composition increases by 23% in the 
group of treated firms with respect to controls, which means that hypothesis H3 is 
confirmed. An inspection of the data shows that firms that before the policy did not 
have any collaboration with universities began to create links with these 
organisations. On the other hand, we did not observe any significant effect on the 
increase in the number of external partners (network breadth), nor on the 
intensification of innovation-related relationships (network depth), which means that 
hypotheses H2 and H4 are rejected.  
 
In short, as a result of policy participation, firms tended to keep the same number of 
external collaborations they had before the policy, as well as the same intensity of 
such collaborations, but they introduced some relevant changes in the nature of their 
partners, starting to work with universities. Therefore, the effect of the policy seems 
to be particularly interesting. It did not stimulate collaboration in a generic sense, but 
it supported the matching between SMEs and knowledge-intensive organisations such 
as universities or research centers. Firms that had a prior propensity towards 
collaboration did not radically change their behaviour, but for the fact that they started 
to collaborate with such organisations. In conclusion, given the difficulties for SMEs 
to establish relationships with universities, we can say that the observed policy has 
achieved at least one important result, that to stimulate relationships between SMEs 
and universities, which is in line with the policymaker's goal. 
 
Table 4. Different types of network additionality 
Outcome variable Firms with prior collaborations Firms without prior collaborations 
 ATT  ATT  
Network persistence 0.114 
(0.103) 
 -0.001 
(0.110) 
 
Universities 0.271 
(0.132) 
** 0.145 
(0.085) 
* 
Intermediaries 0.145 
(0.124) 
 -0.052 
(0.096) 
 
Other firms 0.223 
(0.133) 
* 0.005 
(0.083) 
 
Network breadth 0.119 
(0.117) 
 
 
 
Network composition 0.212 
(0.083) 
** 
 
 
Network depth 0.095 
(0.121)   
 
Note to table: Treated firms in the group of firms with prior relationships are 47, while controls are 33. 
Standard errors are in brackets. Statistical significance: *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01 
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7. Conclusions 
Our paper shows that R&D collaboration policies are able to generate some persistent 
changes in the networking behaviour of participating firms. Adopting a counterfactual 
approach to the evaluation of an R&D collaboration policy intervention implemented 
in an Italian region, we have found that the participation to publicly-funded R&D 
collaboration projects stimulated subsequent SMEs’ collaborations particularly with 
universities and research centres.  
 
This paper tries to go a step further into the analysis of the various types of persistent 
network additionality that can be generated by R&D collaboration policy. For those 
firms that had a prior propensity to collaborate with external organisations (prior to 
their policy participation), we find an interesting effect. Policy participation did not 
induce firms to alter their collaborative behaviour (i.e. they maintained more or less 
the same number of external partners, as well as the intensity of their collaborations), 
but they replaced some old partners with universities and research centers. A similar 
replacement effect has been documented by other studies that show how firms that 
enter into the policy tend to change their partners with respect to the pre-policy period 
(Fier et al., 2006; Caloffi et al., 2015). 
 
Our analysis reveals that the policy achieved at least some of its main goals, which 
were related to the policymaker's willingness to encourage inter-organisational 
relationships, particularly those that can be more generative of innovation. We have 
decided to stop here, without considering other types of additionality effects that can 
be generated by policy participation, and without exploring whether the main goal of 
the policy – namely, that of promoting R&D – was achieved or not. Our decision was 
motivated by the willingness to conduct an in-depth exploration of network 
additionality. However, we are well aware of the fact that we are analysing only a part 
of the story. As discussed by Veugelers (1997), the network per se is not enough. 
More longitudinal research would be needed to investigate what are (if any) the 
relationships between the various types of additionality generated by the policy 
(including R&D additionality) and in particular the mediating role of the network.  
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